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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks'
substantially clarified the burdens of proof in discrimination cases by adopting
what is essentially a pretext-plus analysis. Although considered controversial
by some commentators,2 this decision still affords the plaintiff in a Title VII
* B.A. 1987, The University of Virginia; candidate for J.D., May 1995, University of South
Carolina. The author wishes to thank Professor Thomas Haggard for his comments on earlier
drafts.
1. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
2. See Mark A. Schuman, The Politics of Presumption: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
and the Burdens of Proof in Employment Cases, 9 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL CoMMBNT. 67, 67
(1993)(describing Hicks as "one of the most controversial decisions the Court handed down in
1
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discrimination suit the opportunity to prove discrimination by circumstantial
evidence. At the same time, the Court has taken a stricter view of a plaintiff's
duties, thus preventing frivolous suits while preserving the protections
provided by the Civil Rights Act.'
As part of the civil rights movement, the United States Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' Title VII of the Act prohibits an employer
from discriminating against an employee or potential employee on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.5 In McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green6 the Court attempted to devise an "order and allocation of proof in
a private, non-class action challenging employment discrimination." 7 This
model permits the use of circumstantial evidence to prove disparate treatment8
because of the perceived lack of direct evidence available to Title VII
plaintiffs.9 Justice Powell articulated the relative burdens in his opinion for
a unanimous Court as follows: "The complainant in a Title VII trial must
carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of
racial discrimination . . . . The burden then must shift to the employer to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection .... "10 The employee "must be given a full and fair opportunity
to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for
his rejection were in fact a coverup [or pretext] for a racially discriminatory
decision.""
a largely low-key 1992-93 term.").
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
4. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
5. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a)(1988) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
6. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
7. Id. at 800.
8. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,713 n.1 (1983);
see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971)(articulating the "disparate-
impact" theory).
9. Plaintiffs in a Title VII action may prove their case by direct or circumstantial evidence.
See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 n.3.
10. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
11. Id. at 805. McDonnell Douglas employed Green, a black male, as a mechanic and
laboratory technician until McDonnell Douglas laid him off during a general work force
2
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In several cases, the Court has refined the McDonnell Douglas model.12
However, at least until Hicks, the circuits were split regarding the plaintiff's
ultimate burden under the model. 3 The courts and commentators have
termed the opposing views as "pretext" and "pretext-plus."
Political and ideological views shape an individual's opinion of whether
the impact of Hicks on Title VII cases is controversial. Before Hicks, one
commentator concluded:
What ultimately underlies the controversy over the "pretext-plus" rule
is a battle over policy, not law. The dominant judicial view in the early
years of employment discrimination litigation-that illegal discrimination
is presumed to be prevalent and that plaintiffs must be given ample
opportunity to prove their cases-has given way in the current conservative
climate to a notion that illegal discrimination is a thing of the past and that
plaintiffs more frequently wield discrimination claims as a shield against
all adverse employment actions.14
Rather than characterizing this controversy along ideological or political lines,
it is more accurate to examine whether Title VII continues to offer adequate
protection to victims of discrimination. Hicks assures employees ample
opportunity to pursue discrimination claims while refining the order and
allocation of proof to prevent the abuse of Title VII as a shield against
legitimate, yet adverse, employment decisions.
This Note first examines the model of proof set out in McDonnell Douglas
and the subsequent cases refining the burdens. Next, it reviews Hicks,
focusing on the majority and dissenting opinions and changes in the model.
After looking at the opinions, the Note takes a critical look at the McDonnell
Douglas model, considers whether Hicks has any practical effect on summary
judgment, and then looks at the prospect of a congressional response to the
reduction. Id. at 794. To protest his discharge, Green and other members of the Congress on
Racial Equality participated in illegal activities, including a "stall-in" in which they stalled their
cars to block the morning shift change. Id. at 794-95. A "lock-in" also took place, but the
Court expressed uncertainty about the extent of Green's involvement. Id. at 795. Responding
to McDonnell Douglas's subsequent advertisement for applicants in Green's trade, Green applied
for re-employment. McDonnell Douglas turned Green down because of his participation in the
stall-in and lock-in. Green filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission alleging that McDonnell Douglas's refusal to re-employ him violated the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 because the refusal was based on Green's race and his involvement in the civil rights
movement. Id. at 796.
12. See infra section III.
13. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
14. Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the
"Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 59, 141 (1991)
(concluding that the conservative trend toward a pretext-plus rule unfairly harms plaintiffs).
1995]
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Court's holding. Finally, this Note will review federal court decisions
applying Hicks.
II. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MODEL OF PROOF
Simply put, the McDonnell Douglas model of proof requires three things.
First, the complainant must establish a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion.Is Second, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 6 Finally, the
burden shifts back to the complainant to demonstrate that the employer's
"stated reason for [the employee's] rejection was in fact pretext. " 17  In
subsequent cases, the Court provided some guidance as to what is required to
meet each of these burdens.
A. The Prima Facie Case
In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters's the Court granted certiorari
to address "the exact scope of the prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas.""9 Describing the prima facie case, the Court stated that the
"plaintiff carries the initial burden of showing actions taken by the employer
from which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more
likely than not that such actions were 'based on a discriminatory criterion
illegal under the Act.' "2 This raises a rebuttable presumption of discrimina-
tory intent.2 The Court was willing to presume this because "more often
15. A complainant may establish a prima facie case for racial discrimination:
by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite
his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court noted that the requirements of prima facie
proof vary depending on the facts. Id. at 802 n.13; see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 575-76 (1978) (quoting McDonnell Douglas and discussing the plaintiff's "initial
burden").
16. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court did not detail what was required to
meet this burden. It simply determined that the employer met its burden. Id. at 802-03.
17. Id. at 804. This marks the origin of the "pretext" dispute. See infra note 41. In
McDonnell Douglas the case was remanded to give the complainant an opportunity to make a
showing of pretext. Id.
18. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
19. Id. at 569.
20. Id. at 576 (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358
(1977)).
21. The Court warned, "a McDonnell Douglas prima facie showing is not the equivalent of
a factual finding of discrimination." Id. at 579.
[Vol. 46:333
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than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner."' The Court
continued that once legitimate reasons were eliminated, "it is more likely than
not the employer . . based his decision on an impermissible consideration
such as race."'
The Court never explained the justification for this presumption. Rather,
it appeared to take judicial notice based on its experience.2' One commenta-
tor responded to this taking of judicial notice as follows:
The McDonnell Douglas presumption is based, not upon the accumula-
tion of experience of the coincidence of one set of facts with another, but
upon an ideology which posits that relationship without proof. This
ideology holds that an employment decision adverse to a black, ethnic
minority, or woman who possesses any possibility of performing even
minimally acceptably in the job is very likely due to racism, that the state
is competent to, and must, determine independently of the employer
whether the applicant was qualified for the job and thus whether the
employer's decision was racist or sexist. In other words, racial, sexual,
ethnic, or religious groups would be evenly distributed if not for discrimi-
nation. There is no evidence, of course, to support this notion of
"naturally" random distribution of people's performance or preferences;
to the contrary, much evidence suggests that people usually do not behave
in a random or even distribution....
... The application of the presumption is a political decision intended
to affect out-of-court behavior, in this case by punishing the failure to
favor those in a "protected" class in employment decisions. The presump-
tion, used this way, is a political allocation of power to the state and
certain employees and away from the employer and the employee. s
Regardless of whether the Court's presumption was grounded in precedent,
until recently this initial burden was not the source of substantial controver-
sy.
26
22. Id. at 577.
23. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
24. See id. Noting that the presumption created by the prima facie case is extremely weak,
one commentator has suggested "[tihat presumption lay at the heart of the liberal civil rights
ideology of employment discrimination." Schuman, supra note 2, at 84.
25. Schuman, supra note 2, at 86, 93 (citing THOMAS SOWELL, CIvIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR
REALITY (1984); Thomas Sowell, By the Numbers, in COMPASSION VERSUS GUILT 228-30
(1987)).
26. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254 n.7 (1981) (stating
that inMcDonnel Douglas the prima facie case was used to "denote the establishmentof a legally
mandatory, rebuttable presumption"). See also id. at 256 n.10 (noting that evidence of a prima
facie case may be used to determine if the employer's reason was a pretext).
1995]
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B. The Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason
The first major controversy in the McDonnell Douglas model of proof
regarded the employer's burden to prove that its actions were based on
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. In Furnco the Court articulated the
employer's burden as "proving that he based his employment decision on a
legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race." 27 Because
the Court phrased this step of the model as a burden of proof, the lower courts
began to speculate as to the requirements to meet this burden. The Fifth
Circuit stated, "This court requires [the] defendant to prove nondiscriminatory
reasons by a preponderance of the evidence." Additionally, the Fifth
circuit required that the "defendant must prove that those he hired or promoted
were somewhat better qualified than was [the] plaintiff."29 Phrased this way
the Court's test significantly increases the employer's burden.
Because the Fifth Circuit decision conflicted with interpretations of other
courts of appeals 0 the Supreme Court clarified the employer's burden in
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.31 "[T]o satisfy this
intermediate burden, the employer need only produce admissible evidence
which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment
decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus. "32 The employ-
er's reason "must be clear and reasonably specific"33 so that it frames "the
factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate pretext. "34 However, the employer does not have
to persuade the court that the proffered reason motivated its actions.3" This
confirmed that the employer's burden was one of production, not persuasion.
The legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, once produced, rebuts the
presumption raised by the prima facie case.36
27. 438 U.S. at 577.
28. Burdine v. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing
Turner v. Texas Instruments, 555 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1977)), vacated, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
29. Id. (citing East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1975)).
30. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1980); Jacksonv. United States Steel
Corp., 624 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1980); Ambush v. Montgomery County Gov't, 620 F.2d 1048 (4th
Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979). But see Vaughn v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 620 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 972 (1981).
31. 450 U.S. at 248.
32. Id. at 257.
33. Id. at 258.
34. Id. at 255-56.
35. Id. at 254 (citing Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978). Yet, the Court
pointed that the employer "retains an incentive to persuade the trier of fact that the employment
decision was lawful." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258.
36. Id. at 255.
[Vol. 46:333
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The burden of production is considerably lighter than the burden of
persuasion.37 Rather than requiring an employer to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence the existence of nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating
the employee, the employer need only explain clearly the nondiscriminatory
reasons for its actions.3"
C. Proving Pretext
Assuming that the employer meets its burden of production, "the
McDonnell-Burdine presumption 'drops from the case,'" and the burden shifts
to the employee to prove pretext.39 In United States Postal Service Board of
Governors v. Aikens the majority concluded that the district court erroneously
required the plaintiff "to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent."'
Instead, the Court reiterated its statement in Burdine that a plaintiff "may
succeed ... either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."41 Thus, the
plaintiff may prove its ultimate burden by circumstantial evidence. However,
a new controversy developed over what circumstantial evidence a court would
require.
Justice Rehnquist wrote that at this stage of the model "'the factual
inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.'"42 "The 'factual inquiry' in
a Title VII case is '[whether] the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff. '"43 Despite this unambiguous statement, the circuit courts split
as to whether this required a showing that the employer's legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason was merely pretextual or pretextual specifically for
intentional discrimination.' The factual inquiry is whether the articulated
37. The Court noted, "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."
Id. at 253 (citations omitted).
38. Id. at 260.
39. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)
(quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10). "Of course, the plaintiff must have an adequate
Iopportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment
decision,' but rather a pretext." Id. at 716 n.5 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
40. Id. at 717.
41. Id. at 716 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). This quotation, authored by Justice Powell
based on his interpretation of McDonnell Douglas, see Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (Powell, J.),
may be the source of the pretext controversy. Supporters of both views cite Burdine to support
their respective positions.
42. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255).
43. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
44. Courts and commentators labelled these views "pretext" and "pretext plus." The courts
of appeals for the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits
1995]
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reason was a pretext for intentional discrimination, instead of whether the
employer's reason was a pretext for some legal or otherwise illegal reason.45
The alternative views may be more clearly stated as follows. Assume that
the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, that the defendant articulates a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, and that the plaintiff then has no
additional evidence. At this point there are two options: either the plaintiff
loses as a matter of law on summary judgment or by directed verdict, or the
case goes to the jury. Under the latter option, there are several possibilities.
First, the jury may believe the defendant and the defendant wins. Second, the
jury disbelieves the defendant, but the defendant still wins because even
though the plaintiff proved that the defendant's reason was false, he failed to
prove that the real reason was intentional discrimination. This is the pretext-
plus theory. Third, the jury disbelieves the defendant so it must find for the
plaintiff. This is the pretext-only theory that was clearly rejected by the
Supreme Court in Hicks.46 Finally, the jury disbelieves the defendant and the
jury can find for either the plaintiff or the defendant. Hicks would only allow
a finding for the plaintiff in the unusual case where the plaintiff presents
evidence in excess of that usually required for a prima facie showing that,
combined with the jury's disbelief of the defendant, would allow a reasonable
jury to conclude that the defendant intentionally discriminated. 7
Under the pretext theory" an employee proves intentional discrimination
by showing that the employer's articulated reasons are false. The actual
reason is unimportant. Under the pretext theory, if the employer made the
decision on a legal yet embarrassing or "politically incorrect" basis the
employer still loses.4 9 For example, if an employer chose not to hire a
prospective employee because the employer hates red-headed people, but the
employer was reluctant to admit this fact and chose another legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason to rebut the presumption, the employer would lose.
Under the pretext-plus theory an employee must show that the employer's
articulated reasons are false plus produce some additional evidence that the
had adopted the pretext-only rule. Lanctot, supra note 14, at 71-75. The courts of appeals for
the First, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits followed the pretext-plus rule. Id. at 81-86;
see also id. at 71-75 nn.46-54, 82-86 nn.92-97 (citing cases from each circuit reflecting the split).
45. This burden is consistent with the Court's position in both Aikens and Hicks. But see
Sherie L. Coons, Proving Disparate Treatment After St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Is
Anything Left of McDonnell Douglas?, 19 J. CORP. L. 379, 379 (1994) (arguing that the Court's
holding in Hicks conflicts with established precedent and is "illogical" and "inconsistent");
Emanuel Margolis, Human Rights Commentator, 67 CONN. B.J. 429, 433 (1993) (claiming
Justice Scalia ignored precedent).
46. See infra part III.
47. See infra part III.
48. This theory is also referred to as "pretext-only."
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employer's concealed reason was intentional discrimination.5 ° In the above
hypothetical, the employee may prove that the employer's reason for refusing
to hire the employee was false. However, absent evidence that the employer's
reason constituted intentional discrimination, the employee's action will fail.
Confusion over the plus evidence comes primarily from a misconception that
direct evidence of intentional discrimination is required. However, courts
using this theory allow circumstantial evidence. This circumstantial evidence
must be evidence of discriminatory intent, rather than an inference of
discriminatory intent based on unsupported allegations."
I. ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER V. HICKS
52
Hicks sued St. Mary's Honor Center, after St. Mary's fired him. Hicks
alleged intentional racial discrimination in violation of Section 703(a) (1) of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 53 Hicks brought the suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which found
for St. Mary's.5" The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed and remanded.55  The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to
determine whether, in a suit against an employer alleging intentional racial
discrimination in violation of ... Title VII .... the trier of fact's rejection
of the employer's asserted reasons for its actions mandates a finding for
[Hicks]."56
St. Mary's Honor Center employed Hicks, a black male, as a correctional
officer beginning in 1978. A review of St. Mary's administration resulted in
extensive supervisory changes. Hicks retained his position, but his immediate
50. Pretext-plus courts often cite in support "their concern for the ability of employers to
exercise business judgment." Melissa A. Essary, The Dismantling of McDonnell Douglas v.
Green: The High Court Muddies the Evidentiary Waters in CircumstantialDiscrimination Cases,
21 PEPP. L. REv. 385, 405 (1994) (footnote omitted).
51. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant "may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of [the nomnovant's] pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing there is a
genuine issue for trial." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986); see also infra part VII.
52. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
53. Id. at 2746. Section 703(a)(1) provides in relevant part: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer-() ... to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1988).
54. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd, 970 F.2d
487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
55. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742
(1993).
56. 113 S. Ct. at 2746.
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supervisor and superintendent were replaced. Although Hicks maintained a
satisfactory employment record before the supervisory changes were made,
after the changes Hicks "became the subject of repeated, and increasingly
severe, disciplinary actions." 57 Hicks was demoted, then discharged for
threatening his immediate supervisor.5"
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia's majority opinion applied the McDonnell Douglas
allocation of burdens of production and proof.59 St. Mary's did not challenge
the district court's finding that Hicks satisfied the "minimal requirements" of
the prima facie case.' This showing effectively "create[d] a presumption
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee."6 The
majority pointed out that although this presumption shifts the burden of
production to the defendant, the burden of persuasion remains with the
plaintiff.62
To rebut this presumption, the burden shifted to St. Mary's to produce
evidence that the employer took its adverse employment action "'for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.'" '63 St. Mary's introduced "evidence
of two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for [its] actions: the severity and
the accumulation of rules violations" by Hicks. 4 Hicks did not challenge the
finding that St. Mary's sustained its burden of production. 5 Therefore, the
presumption raised by the prima facie showing "drop[ped] from the case."6 6
Following the McDonnell Douglas model, the burden then shifted back
to Hicks. He had "'the full and fair opportunity to demonstrate,' through
presentation of his own case and through cross-examination of the defendant's
witnesses, 'that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employ-
ment decision' and that race was.'67 The district court found that Hicks was
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Justice
Scalia. Justice Souter authored the dissenting opinion in which Justices White, Blackmun, and
Stevens joined. Id. at 2745.
60. Id. at 2747. Hicks demonstrated the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case "by proving
(1) that he is black, (2) that he was qualified for the position of shift commander, (3) that he was
demoted from that position and ultimately discharged, and (4) that the position remained open and
was ultimately filled by a white man." Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747 (citations omitted).
61. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254).
62. Id. (quoting Burdine, at 253).
63. Id. (quoting Burdine, at 254).
64. Id.
65. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747.
66. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10.
67. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
[Vol. 46:333
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the only St. Mary's supervisor disciplined for his subordinates' rules
violations, that St. Mary's either disregarded or treated more leniently similar
and more serious violations Hicks's coworkers committed, and that Hicks's
immediate supervisor manufactured the heated confrontation resulting in
Hicks's discharge.68 Based on these findings, the district court found that St.
Mary's asserted reasons for Hicks's demotion and discharge were not the real
reasons. However, the court concluded that Hicks failed to prove "by direct
evidence or inference that his unfair treatment was motivated by his race."69
The court of appeals set this decision aside on the ground that Hicks
proved St. Mary's proffered reasons were pretextual. Upon such a showing,
the court held that Hicks was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.7" The
court held that the record "compel[s] a conclusion that [Hicks] is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.""
The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals' holding, saying that
it "disregards the fundamental principle of Rule 301 that a presumption does
not shift the burden of proof, and ignores our repeated admonition that the
Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the 'ultimate burden of persuasion.''72
On the contrary, the Court held that the fact finder's rejection of the
employer's reasons "will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of
discrimination"73 without requiring "'additional proof of discrimination.'"'7
This statement, read outside the context of the entire opinion, appears to
endorse the pretext-only theory. However, the Court attempted to alleviate
any confusion by including a footnote that stated that this holding is not
inconsistent with other statements made in the opinion.'7 One of these other
68. Id. at 2748.
69. Id. at 1252. The district court based this finding, in part, on the fact that two blacks sat
on the disciplinary review board recommending the discipline, that Hicks's black subordinates
who actually committed the violations were not disciplined, and that "the number of black
employees at St. Mary's remained constant." Id.
70. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct.
2742 (1993). The Court reasoned:
Because all of [St. Mary's] proffered reasons were discredited, defendants were in a
position of having offered no legitimate reason for their actions. In other words,
defendants were in no better position than if they had remained silent, offering no
rebuttal to an established inference that they had unlawfully discriminated against
[Hicks] on the basis of his race.
Id.
71. Id. at 493.
72. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2748-49 (1993) (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 2749 (footnote omitted).
74. Id. (quoting Hicks, 970 F.2d at 493).
75. See id. at 2749 n.4. The footnote states:
Contrary to the dissent's confusion-producinganalysis, there is nothing whatever
inconsistent between this statement and our later statements that (1) the plaintiff must
show "both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason,"
1995]
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statements requires the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason was false and
that the real reason was discrimination.76 Another says that "it is not
enough... to disbelieve the employer."' Both of these statements support
the pretext-plus theory.
Rather than elaborate on how these statements should be reconciled into
a test for the lower courts to apply,78 Justice Scalia "begrudgingly"7 9
utilized the balance of the opinion to counter the dissent's attacks.' The
dissent's criticism focused on the fact that the majority threw out "a frame-
work carefully crafted in precedents as old as 20 years. "81
Justice Scalia began his rebuttal of the dissent by discussing Burdine.n
Burdine states that after the employer meets its burden, "the plaintiff must then
have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were
a pretext for discrimination. "83 Scalia argued that "[the dissent takes this
to mean that if the plaintiff proves the asserted reason to be false, the plaintiff
wins."' 4 But Scalia felt that "a reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for
discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason."' This appears to be a debate regarding
the pretext-only and pretext-plus theories.
The majority concluded this debate by saying, "[lWhatever doubt Burdine
might have created was eliminated by Aikens. There we said, in language that
and (2) "it is not enough ... to disbelieve the employer." Even though (as we say
here) rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons is enough at law to sustain a
finding of discrimination, there must be a finding of discrimination.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 2752.
77. Id. at 2754.
78. This issue is addressed infra part IV.
79. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2751. The Court said:
it is to [the dissent's reliance on dicta in this Court's opinions] that we now
turn-begrudgingly, since we think it is generally undesirable, where the holdings of
the Court are not at issue, to dissect the sentences of the United States Reports as
thought they were the United States Code.
Id. (Scalia, J.).
80. "We mean to answer the dissent's accusations in detail, by examining our cases, but at
the outset it is worth noting the utter implausibility that we would ever have held what the dissent
says we held." Id. at 2750.
81. Id. at 2764 (Souter, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 2751-54. The majority agreed with dissent on the meaning of one quote from
Burdine, but disagreed on its relevance.
See id. 2751-52.
83. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2751-52.
84. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
85. Id.
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cannot reasonably be mistaken, that 'the ultimate question [is] discrimination
vel non. ' "86 Scalia quoted Aikens as defining the ultimate factual issue as
"'whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.'"8
The majority determined that its interpretation of the excerpts from Burdine
were more consistent with precedent and eliminated internal inconsistencies
created by the dissent's interpretation.18 Applying Burdine and Aikens, the
majority closed this discussion by saying, "It is not enough, in other words,
to disbelieve the employer; the factfmder must believe the plaintiffs
explanation of intentional discrimination."89
Responding to the dissent's and employee's prediction of dire consequenc-
es arising from the Court's decision, the Court engaged in an unnecessary
discussion of fibbery. 9° The Court offered dicta that it would be "absurd"
to conclude disbelieved testimony becomes pejury.9' There is always a risk
that either party may lie. But as the Court pointed out, the rules of procedure
provide adequate remedies. 2 An adverse judgment under Title VII is not one
of them.93
The majority then addressed the dissent's attack on procedural issues.
The crux of the dissent's argument was that by allowing for the possibility that
an employer may lie and still prevail the plaintiff must refute all potential
legitimate reasons that one could infer from the record.' The majority
concluded that it "makes no sense to contemplate 'the employer who is caught
in a lie but succeeds in injecting into the trial an unarticulated reason for its
actions. ' " 95
Next, the majority considered the employee's contention that the employer
should be forced to stand by its articulated reasons and suffer Title VII
damages if the plaintiff disproves them.
86. Id. at 2753 (quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711, 714 (1983)) (alteration in original). The phrase "vel non" means "[o]r not." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1555 (6th ed. 1990).
87. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2753 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715).
88. See id. at 2751-52.
89. Id. at 2754.
90. See id. at 2754-55. The concern regarding the risk of an employer lying to improve his
position in the McDonnell Douglas order proof is not new. See generally Lanctot, supra note
14, at 59.
91. 113 S. Ct. at 2754.
92. The Court cited Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 11 and 56(g) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1621. Id. at 2755.
93. See id. at 2755.
94. See id. at 2755-56; id. at 2761-64 (Souter, J., dissenting). "Under the scheme announced
today, any conceivable explanation for the employer's actions that might be suggested by the
evidence, however unrelated to the employer's articulated reasons, must be addressed by a
plaintiff who does not wish to risk losing." Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2763 (Souter, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2755 (quoting id. at 2764 n.13) (Souter, J., dissenting).
1995]
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The employer should bear, [the employee] contends, "the responsibility for
its choices and the risk that plaintiff will disprove any pretextual reasons
and therefore prevail." It is the "therefore" that is problematic. Title VII
does not award damages against employers who cannot prove a nondis-
criminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only against
employers who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by
reason of (in the context of the present case) race.
96
Again, the majority appears to be advancing a pretext-plus argument.
B. The Dissent
Justice Souter authored an uncharacteristically angry dissent. 97 The
thrust of the dissent is that the majority abandoned the framework the Court
established in McDonnell Douglas and ignored precedent reaffirming and
refining its application.98 Justice Souter interpreted the majority holding as
follows:
Ignoring language to the contrary in both McDonnell Douglas and Burdine,
the Court holds that, once a Title VII plaintiff succeeds in showing at trial
that the defendant has come forward with pretextual reasons for its actions
in response to a prima facie showing of discrimination, the fact finder still
may proceed to roam the record, searching for some nondiscriminatory
explanation that the defendant has not raised and that the plaintiff has had
no fair opportunity to disprove.
99
The majority denied that this was its holding."°
The dissent then analyzed the initial step in the McDonnell Douglas
model. 101 It took the position that a "prima facie case is indeed a proven
case. " 102
Although, in other contexts, a prima facie case only requires production
of enough evidence to raise an issue for the trier of fact, here it means that
the plaintiff has actually established the elements of the prima facie case
96. 113 S. Ct. at 2756 (citing Brief of Respondent at 30).
97. Justices White, Blackmun and Stevens joined Justice Souter in his dissenting opinion. Id.
at 2756.
98. See id. at 2756-57 (Souter, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting).
100. "We mean to answer the dissent's accusations in detail, by examining our cases, but at
the outset it is worth noting the utter implausibility that we would ever have held what the dissent
says we held." Id. at 2750.
101. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2757-58 (Souter, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 2758 (Souter, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 46:333
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to the satisfaction of the factfinder by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 0 3
This statement itself is consistent with the precedent, but the dissent applied
it in a conclusive rather than presumptive fashion."°4
The dissent then criticized the majority regarding the employer's burden.
The dissent read the majority opinion as allowing the employer to offer a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason and, if disproved, to rely on unarticulated
reasons in the record."0 5  The majority emphatically denied this reading. 6
The dissent supported this claim by pointing to the dual functions of the
employer burden. The first is to rebut the presumption raised by the prima
facie showing."t The second, which the dissent asserted the majority
neglected, is "'to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the
plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext.'"108
The dissent seems to have concluded that by not compelling judgment for the
plaintiff upon a showing of mere pretext, the majority allowed the employer
to rely on admissible evidence in the record other than the reasons articulat-
ed.'09 The dissent decided that this was "unfair to plaintiffs, unworkable in
103. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981)). The dissent relied on a footnote in Burdine to suggest that the prima
facie case is conclusive, rather than presumptive. The dissent's reading of the footnote and
citation to Wigmore appears to use the correct words, but incorporate a definition other than that
adopted by the Burdine Court. Compare Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2758 (Souter, J., dissenting) with
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7.
104. Does this suggest a shift from the weight given a prima facie case by the majority or has
the dissent misread the application of the prima facie case? The dissent thought that it would be
"unfair and utterly impractical to saddle the victims of discrimination with the burden of either
producing direct evidence of discriminatory intent or eliminating the entire universe of possible
nondiscriminatory reasons for a personnel decision." Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2758 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). The majority did not suggest a possible universe. It suggested that the employee
must discount facts in record that support the inference that the employer did not discriminate
(e.g., if the employee were terminated by a supervisor of the same race). This may be
accomplished by either direct or circumstantial evidence. After all, proving that an employer
intentionally discriminated is essentially the burden of proof.
105. See id. at 2759-64 (Souter, J., dissenting).
106. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
107. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981)).
109. See id. at 2761 n.10, 2763 (Souter, J., dissenting). This conclusion arises from the
majority's statement that "the 'new level of specificity' may also (as we believe) refer to the fact
that the inquiry now turns from the few generalized factors that establish a prima facie case to
the specific proofs and rebuttals of discriminatory motivation the parties have introduced." Id.
at 2752. This defines the point in the model where, although the fact finder doubts the proffered
reasons, it looks to the plaintiff, with its burden of proof, for evidence of intentional discrimina-
tion. Naturally, the employer responds.
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practice, and inexplicable in forgiving employers who present false evidence
in court."110
The dissent devoted its final pages to general criticism of the majority for
ignoring precedent and creating a "'pretext-plus' approach""' that would
chill Title VII litigation and increase expenses and delays.1 2  It suggested
that the majority's model rewards a company for lying about the reason for the
adverse employment decision." Potential plaintiffs would be forced to
anticipate all potential side issues and participate in "more extensive and wide-
ranging 'discovery.'" 114 These increased litigation requirements would
"promote longer trials and more pre-trial discovery, threatening increased
expense and delay in Title VII litigation for plaintiffs and defendants, and
increased burdens on the judiciary."
115
Most importantly, the dissent pointed to what is likely to be the dividing
issue: the assumption underlying the McDonnell Douglas framework.
1 6
"Contrary to the assumption underlying the McDonnell Douglas framework,
that employers will have 'some reason' for their hiring and firing decisions,
the majority assumes that some employers will be unable to discover the
reason for their own personnel actions."' The basis for the dissenting
opinion lies in this division. The dissenters were unwilling to question this
underlying assumption and the possibility that it must be altered to prevent
abuse of Title VII by those it was designed to protect.
C. The New Model of Proof.- A Refined Pretext-Plus Test
The majority in Hicks adopted the pretext-plus test for application in the
final stage of the McDonnell Douglas model of proof. The majority failed to
term its holding as pretext-plus, but the language employed in the majority
opinion is unmistakable." 8
First, the majority rejected the holding by the court of appeals that
rejection of the employer's asserted reasons for its actions compels summary
110. Id. at 2761 (Souter, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting).
112. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2763 (Souter, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 2763 n.11, (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra note 94 and accompanying
text.
114. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2763 (Souter, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 2764 (Souter, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Furneo Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978))
(citation omitted).
118. But cf. Norma G. Whitis, Note, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: The Title VII Shifting
Burden Stays Put, 25 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 269 (1994) (suggesting that Hicks rejected pretext-plus
and pretext-only rules and adopted a hybrid test).
[Vol. 46:333
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judgment for the plaintiff." 9 The majority's statement that "a reason cannot
be proved to be a 'pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown both that the
reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason"' furthers this
proposition.
McDonnell Douglas does not say . . . that all the plaintiff need do is
disprove the employer's asserted reason. In fact, it says just the opposite:
[O]n the retrial respondent must be given a full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons
for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory
decision. 121
119. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2748-49. This suggests that in a jury trial the plaintiff must do
more than persuade the jury not to believe the employer's proffered reason. The American Bar
Association Section on Litigation recently promulgated model jury instructions reflecting this
position:
Defenses to Indirect Evidence of Discrimination
In this case, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
[his/her] [membership in a protected class] was a motivating factor in the defendant's
decision [to discharge/not to hire/etc.] [him/her]. The plaintiff's [membership in a
protected class] was a motivating factor if you find that it played a role in the
defendant's decision, even though other factors may have also played roles in that
decision.
You must consider any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason or explanation stated
by the defendant for its decision. If you find that the defendant has stated a valid
reason, then you must decide in favor of the defendant unless the plaintiff proves by
a preponderance of the evidence that the stated reason was not the true reason but is
only a pretext or excuse for discriminating against plaintiff because of [his/her]
[membership in a protected class].
The plaintiff can attempt to prove pretext directly by persuading you by a preponderance
of the evidence that [his/her] [membership on a protected class] was more likely the reason
for the defendant's decision than the reason stated by the defendant.
The defendant can also attempt to prove that the defendant's stated reason for its
decision [to discharge/notto hire/etc.] is a pretext by persuading you that it is just not
believable. However, it is not enough for the plaintiff simply to prove that the
defendant's stated reason for its decision was not the true reason. The reason for this
is that the plaintiff always must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
[he/she] was [discharge/not hired/etc.] because of [his/her] [membership in a
protected class]. Therefore, even if you decide that the defendant did not truly rely
on the stated reason for its decision [to discharge/not to hire/etc.], you cannot decide
in favor of the plaintiff without further evidence that the defendant relied on the
plaintiff's [membership in a protected class].
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION ON LITIGATION, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS
COMMITTEE, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1.02[3][a] (1994).
120. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
121. Id. at 2753 (alteration in original) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 805 (1973)).
17
Tighe: The Refined Pretext-Plus Analysis: Employees' and Employers' Resp
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Thus, mere pretext is insufficient; a showing of racial discrimination is
required.
The Court clearly distinguished pretext from "pretext for discrimination,"
noting that "'pretext' means . 'pretext for the sort of discrimination
prohibited by [Title VII].'"' "It is not enough, in other words, to
disbelieve the employer; the factfimder must believe the plaintiff's explanation
of intentional discrimination."1 3  It is impossible to manipulate these
statements to suggest that mere pretext is sufficient to compel judgment for an
employee. Moreover, "the ultimate question [is] discrimination vel non,"1
24
not pretext vel non.
The majority's adoption of a pretext-plus requirement would be uncontro-
verted, except in one part of the majority's opinion the Court said:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may,
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show
intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered
reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination, and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that,
upon such rejection, "[n]o additional proof of discrimination is re-
quired."
It is tempting to borrow from the majority's reasoning that Burdine's "dictum
contradicts or renders inexplicable numerous other statements." 2 6 Presum-
ably, however, the Court would not repeat a mistake that would lead to
erroneous interpretations of its holding. Therefore, the Court must have
intended a reading compatible with its pretext-plus comments.
To understand the Court's intention, one must look to its initial discussion
of the prima facie case. The Court stated, "Petitioners do not challenge the
District Court's finding that respondent satisfied the minimal requirements of
such a prima facie case."17 The use of the word "minimal" suggests that
the Court perceives different degrees of the prima facie case. For example,
a plaintiff presenting a prima facie case of racial discrimination may make only
122. Id. at 2752 n.6 (alteration in original) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804).
The dissent called this "a halfhearted attempt to rewrite these passages from McDonnell
Douglas." Id. at 2759 n.5 (Souter, J. dissenting).
123. Id. at 2754. This clarifies what a jury must find but, other than requiring more than a
showing of mere pretext, the Court does not articulate what evidence will support this finding.
124. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2753 (alteration in original).
125. Id. at 2749 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor
Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 493 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993)).
126. Id. at 2752.
127. Id. at 2747 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 46:333
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a minimal showing that (1) the plaintiff was within the protected class; (2) the
plaintiff was qualified for the position at issue; (3) the plaintiff suffered
adverse employment action; and (4) the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants with similar qualifications.'28 As in
Hicks, the plaintiff need prove only a few facts to meet this initial burden. 2 9
The Court's opinion leaves open the possibility that the employee may prove
additional facts, either through the use of direct or indirect evidence, in excess
of those required to make the prima facie showing.130  However, once the
employer proffers a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
action, the presumption raised by the prima facie showing "drops from the
case."' 3 ' The controversial language in Hicks3 1 allows an employee to
present and prove enough facts in the prima facie showing that, in addition to
disproving the employer's asserted reason as pretextual, might reasonably
create an inference that the employer intentionally discriminated.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently applied this reasoning. In
Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co.'33 the court affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment on Title VII and ADEA charges for an employer because,
although the plaintiff established a prima facie case, the plaintiff did not offer
in the prima facie case and rebuttal evidence to refute the employer's stated
reason that would permit a rational trier of fact to find that the employer
intentionally discriminated. 13
[l]n deciding whether an issue of fact has been created about the credibility
of the employer's nondiscriminatory reasons, the district court must look
at the evidence supporting the prima facie case, as well as the other
evidence offered by the plaintiff to rebut the employer's offered reasons.
And, in those cases where the prima facie case consists of no more than
the minimum necessary to create a presumption of discrimination under
McDonnell Douglas, plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact. 3 '
128. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973).
129. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1249-50 (E.D. Mo. 1991),
rev'd, 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
130. See Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994) ("In offering aprima
facie case, of course, a plaintiff may present evidence going far beyond the minimum
requirements.").
131. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 & n.10 (1981). "In
saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply that the trier of fact no longer
may consider evidence previously introduced by the plaintiff to establish the prima facie case."
Id. at 255 n. 10.
132. See supra text accompanying note 125.
133. 26 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1994).
134. Id. at 892.
135. Id. at 890 (discussing Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d
1995]
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Had the employee presented additional evidence in its prima facie showing, the
employee might have survived the summary judgment motion by proving an
inference of intentional discrimination based on the additional evidence
presented and the evidence rebutting the employer's proffered reasons.
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL MISUNDERSTANDING AND RATIONALE
Some criticize the majority opinion of Hicks, claiming that its holding
effectively destroys an employee's ability to prove a claim of intentional
discrimination because the plus analysis requires the employee to present direct
evidence.' 36 This criticism represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the
purpose of the McDonnell Douglas model of proof and the Hicks holding.
The court created the McDonnell Douglas model of proof because direct
evidence of intentional discrimination rarely exists. 37 The model of proof
provides plaintiffs with an opportunity to prove their case by circumstantial
evidence. The pretext-plus analysis is consistent with that objective because
the "plus" requirement can be satisfied by using circumstantial evidence.' 38
The McDonnell Douglas model never required direct evidence of intentional
discrimination, and it does not now. Rather than direct evidence of the "plus"
factor, Hicks requires production of any evidence indicating that it was more
likely than not that the employer discriminated on the basis of race or some
other proscribed consideration.
The majority held that proof of pretext does not compel judgment for the
plaintiff and refined the McDonnell Douglas model of proof to employ a
pretext-plus test. However, the Court failed to articulate a clear rationale for
its decision. Instead, it spent a large portion of the opinion defending its
position from the dissent's attacks. Other than relying on precedent, the
majority offers little indication of its applied rationale.
Commentators typically identify the pretext-plus position with a politically
conservative position.'39  Justice Scalia, a Reagan appointee, usually
expresses a conservative viewpoint, and his opinion in Hicks typifies that
ideology. Hicks is consistent with opinions Scalia wrote while sitting on the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 4 '
The majority opinion, however, appears to express more than a simple
conservative position. The majority disagrees with the dissent's basic
1104 (9th Cir. 1991).
136. See generally Essary, supra note 50, at 387-94.
137. "There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes."
United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,716 (1983).
138. But see Lanctot, supra note 14, at 141.
139. See, e.g., id. at 70.




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss2/6
PRETEXT-PLUS ANALYSIS
assumption that employers act with intentional discrimination. This may
reflect a change in the Court's approach to Title VII cases.14 However, the
Court more likely determined that it needed to curb abuses of Title VII
litigation by those persons Title VII was designed to protect. Because the
Court created the McDonnell Douglas model, it had jurisdiction to modify its
application in order to best enforce the statute. 1
42
There have been articles and books in recent years suggesting that
employment discrimination laws are ill-equipped to correct the problems faced
by minorities. 143 - One of the most controversial is FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:
THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS."' In this book,
Richard Epstein advocates repeal of Title VII. Epstein argues that the present
consensus about anti-discrimination principle
focuses too heavily on historic injustices, for which there is no adequate
remedy, and too little on the economic and social consequences that are
generated by the anti-discrimination laws, especially as they have been
shaped and are extended within the American political system. The future
and present are being slighted in favor of the past. 45
Epstein's book could be characterized as a "Modest Proposal"'46 to
encourage supporters of the anti-discriminatory measures to re-evaluate their
methods. In the case of Title VII discrimination, the Court apparently has
determined that the pretext-only theory allows persons whom the statute is
designed to protect to use-or abuse-it to deter employers from taking any
141. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
142. Furthermore, if Congress disagrees with the Court, it has authority to reverse the Court's
position through legislation. See infra part VI.
143. See generally THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY (1984); WALTER
E. WILLIAMS, THE STATE AGAINST BLACKS (1982); John J. Donohue III, Is Title VIIEfficient?
134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986).
144. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
145. Id. at 2. The author neither agrees with Epstein nor suggests that the Supreme Court has
followed Epstein's direction. Before accepting either Epstein's or Sowell's assertions, one should
carefully consider all of the available evidence. For example, the United States Office of
Personnel Management recently released the results of a study conducted by labor sociologist
Hilary Silver of Brown University. The study, reported to allow for differences in age,
educationjob performance and other factors, found that blacks in the federal work force are fired
at nearly twice the rate of whites. See Has Subtle Racism Replaced Overt Bias in the
Workplace?, MIAMI HERALD, October 20, 1994, at Al.
146. Jonathan Swift wrote the essay A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Children of Poor
People in Ireland From Being a Burden to Their Parents or Country in 1729 in response to
worsening conditions in Ireland resulting from the potato famine. In this classic satire, Swift
proposes in great detail how the overpopulation problem could be solved by having 100,000 one-
year old children slaughtered and served as food.
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adverse employment action out of fear of being sued.147 The Court has
concluded that the pretext-plus version of the model of proof is the most
effective means of protecting victims while preventing abuse. If the consensus
is that Title VII does not prevent more subtle forms of discrimination,
Congress is the appropriate forum for improvements.
41
V. CRITIQUE OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS .
Even in its refined form after Hicks there still is some question regarding
the basic assumptions upon which the McDonnell Douglas analysis is based.
For example, the presumption of intentional discrimination raised by the prima
facie case appears to be based on nothing more than judicial notice.
49
[WMe are willing to presume this largely because we know from our
experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary
manner, without any underlying reasons .... [I]t is more likely than not
the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based
his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race.150
Although it may be reasonable to assume that employers act with some reason,
this presumption is reasonable only if one also can assume that employees who
suffer an adverse employment action will not bring unsubstantiated Title VII
actions. If the latter assumption cannot be made, then the former assumption
is unwarranted. "The McDonnell Douglas presumption is based, not upon the
accumulation of experience of the coincidence of one set of facts with another,
but upon an ideology which posits that relationship without proof."'
"Hicks threatens the liberal ideology that 'evil' prejudices are so deeply
enmeshed that, even where they are not proven, they must be presumed.'1
2
Another criticism is that the McDonnell Douglas model does not function
on a "color-blind" basis.' The statutory language' of Title VII protects
"any individual," not just minorities. Furthermore, the Court has stated that
Title VII protection is not limited to members of historically or socially
disfavored groups."1' However, the Court did not clarify whether the prima
facie case in the McDonnell Douglas model must be altered in reverse
147. Excessive damage awards only make this type of abuse more appealing to disgruntled
employees. See Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co., No. BC 075519 consolidatedwith BC 08355 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. 10/24/94) (awarding $89.6 million on race bias claims).
148. See infra section VI.
149. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
150. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
151. Schuman, supra note 2, at 86; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
152. Schuman, supra note 2, at 94.
153. See EPSTEIN, supra note 144, at 176-78.
154. See supra note 5.
155. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
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discrimination cases,15 6 since it is designed for use by members of protected
classes. 1
5 7
Several circuit courts have modified the McDonnell Douglas model in
reverse discrimination cases, holding that the plaintiff raises an inference of
racial discrimination only when he satisfies the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie test and presents evidence of background circumstances to support the
suspicion that the defendant discriminates against whites.158 On the other
hand, several circuits have held that establishing a prima facie case entitles a
reverse discrimination plaintiff to an inference of discrimination.' 59
Decisions applying either version in reverse discrimination cases are
highly suspect. In Pilditch v. Board of Education"6 the court stated: "The
notion that all black decision-makers are driven by [discrimination against
whites] rests on just the type of stereotype the civil rights laws were designed
to prevent from infecting personnel decisions; it would be painfully ironic if
those same laws were here used to perpetuate such stereotypes. "161 Presum-
ably, the goal of civil rights laws also includes preventing perpetuating the
stereotype that whites discriminate against blacks. However, it does not seem
possible to square these goals when applying the McDonnell Douglas model
in reverse discrimination cases, because it is not a color-blind test.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE To HICKS
As the Hicks dissent noted:
It is not as though Congress is unaware of our decisions concerning Title
VII, and recent experience indicates that Congress is ready to act if we
adopt interpretations of this statutory scheme it finds to be mistaken.
Congress has taken no action to indicate that we were mistaken in
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.1
62
156. See Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 588 (10th Cir. 1992).
157. Indeed, McDonnell Douglas "is silent on the question of whether disparate treatment
claims could be raised by whites, and if so whether they would be governed by the same sort of
rules. But its silence on that critical question speaks volumes." EPSTEIN, supra note 144, at 177.
158. See Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Notari 971 F.2d at 588-89;
Donaghy v. City of Omaha, 933 F.2d 1448, 1458 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 938
(1992); Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67-68 (6th Cir. 1985).
159. See Pilditch v. Board of Educ., 3 F.3d 1113, 1116-17 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1065 (1994); Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301, 304 (11th Cir. 1991); Young v. City of
Houston, 906 F.2d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 1990). See also McGrath v. Baltimore County Community
Colleges, 1994 WL 118024 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion) (holding that plaintiff
established a prima facie case of retaliation).
160. 3 F.3d 1113 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1065 (1994).
161. Id. at 1119.
162. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2765-66 (1993) (Souter, J. dissenting)
1995"I
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In the eighteen months since Hicks was decided, Congress has taken no action
indicating that the majority was mistaken. However, two bills have been
introduced that would compel a finding of intentional discrimination upon a
showing of mere pretext. 63
VII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
16
Hicks certainly will affect pretrial dispositive motions. However, it is
unclear whether this benefits employers, employees, or neither."6  If the
employee fails to present a prima facie case, then the employer is entitled to
summary judgment."6 If the employee makes a prima facie showing and the
employer fails to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action, the employee is entitled to summary judgment. 67 It is
at this point that the summary judgment issue becomes more complicated
because Hicks failed to explain what evidence is required to survive an
employer's motion for summary judgment.
When reviewing the standards for summary judgment in discrimination
cases, one court offered the following:
[T]he Second Circuit has also expressed an unwillingness to allow "the
mere incantation of intent or state of mind ... [to] operate as a talisman
to defeat an otherwise valid [summary judgment] motion." Such an
approach . . . would render the summary judgment rule sterile in
discrimination cases, where intent is inevitably at issue. In fact, the
Second Circuit has flatly stated that "the salutary purposes of summary
judgment-avoiding protracted, expensive and harassing trials-apply no
less to discrimination cases than to commercial or other areas of litiga-
tion." Therefore the courts of this Circuit will not shrink from granting
a motion for summary judgment where the non-movant's proof "amounts
to no more than speculation and conjecture."1 61
(citing Civil Rights Act of 1991, 102 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071).
163. See H.R. 2867, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2787, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993).
164. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
165. See Lanctot, supra note 14, at 66 (explaining that under the pretext-plus rule, a plaintiff
would be unable to survive summary judgment without negating the defendant's proffered reason
and affirmatively demonstrating that the real reason was discrimination); Whitis, supra note 118,
at 282 (suggesting that it will be more difficult for defendants to win summary judgment); see
also Richard L. Alfred & Michael D. Ricciuti, Burden of Production and Proof in Employment
Discrimination Cases: An Endangered Future for Summary Judgment Motions? 38 B.B.J. Jan.-
Feb. 1994, at 7 (concluding that Hicks will make it more difficult for either party to win pretrial
dispositive motions).
166. See Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 383 (8th Cir. 1994).
167. Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
168. Cianfrano v. Babbitt, 851 F. Supp. 41, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (alteration in original)
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Most of the circuits have addressed the issue of what a plaintiff must do
to withstand summary judgment after an employer has proffered legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action. Several circuits
have held that an employee must do more than offer evidence that the
employer's proffered reasons are a pretext.169 The First Circuit absolutely
(quoting Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829 (1985);
Resource Developers v. Statue of Liberty - Ellis Island Found., 926 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir.
1991)). In Cianfrano, the court held that the plaintiff's evidence of discrimination was, at best,
"'merely colorable'" and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 49-50
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).
169. Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 985 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting.Connell v.
Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1172 n.3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218 (1991)); see
also Woods v. Friction Materials, 30 F.3d 255, 260 (1st Cir. 1994); McLee v. Chrysler Corp.,
38 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1994) (removing an employment discrimination case by writ of mandamus
from a district judge who refused to follow the circuit's pretext-plus rule at the summary
judgment stage); Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1994); LeBlanc v. Great
American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 842-43 (1st Cir. 1993) ("In this circuit, we have always required
not only 'minimally sufficient evidence of pretext,' but evidence that overall reasonably supports
a finding of discriminatory animus." (quoting Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1117), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1398 (1994)).
The Fourth Circuit appears to adopt the pretext-plus analysis. See Lofton v. Marsh, 1994
WL 318787 (4th Cir. July 1, 1994) (unpublished opinion) (holding that the district court correctly
observed that in a Title VII case the plaintiff must do more than disprove the defendant's
articulated reasons, he must establish that the articulated reasons were a pretext for prohibited
discrimination); Sabry v. Gilbert See. Serv., Inc., 1994 WL 328278 n.6 (4th Cir. July 11, 1994)
(unpublished opinion) (stating that even if the defendant's articulated reasons were shown to be
pretextual, judgment for the defendant would be proper because the plaintiff did not carry the
ultimate burden of proving that he was terminated on the basis of race or national origin). See
also Bailey v. South Carolina Dep't of Social Serv., 851 F. Supp. 219, 221 n.3 (D.S.C. 1993)
(interpreting Hicks as having "changed the focus of the final prong of the 'shifting burdens'
analysis at the summary judgment stage from whether the defendant's proffered reason is
pretextual to simply whether the plaintiff can show evidence sufficient for the factfinder to
conclude that the defendant's adverse employment decision was wrongfully based on an
impermissible factor such as race or gender." (citing LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836
(1st [sic] Cir. 1993)).
The Fifth Circuit requires "'some proof that age motivated the employer's action, otherwise
the law has been converted from one preventing discrimination because of age to one ensuring
dismissals only for just cause to all people over 40.'" Moore v. Eli Lilly & Co., 990 F.2d 812,
816 (5th Cir.) (quoting Blenkowski v. American Airlines, 851 F.2d 1503, 1508 n.6 (5th Cir.
1988)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 467 (1993). See also Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d
955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiff must prove that "the proffered reasons are not just
pretexts, but pretexts for age discrimination"); Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 66-67
(5th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the evidence did not support a finding of pretext on a motion for
summary judgment in a racial discrimination case).
The Tenth Circuit has been cited to follow the First, Second and Fifth Circuit. See
Waldron v. SL Industries, 849 F. Supp. 996, 1004 n.l1 (D.N.J. 1994). However, the language
of the court is unclear. See Durham v. Xerox Corp., 18 F.3d 836 (10th Cir.) (finding that the
plaintiff offered neither direct evidence of intentional discrimination nor sufficient indirect
evidence in a reverse discrimination action under § 1981), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 80 (1994).
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rejected the argument that "once evidence of pretext is offered, that evidence
along with the prima facie case will at all times shield the plaintiff from
adverse summary judgments."170 The EEOC advanced this argument in its
amicus curiae brief based on the following language in Hicks: "The
factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly
if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with
the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimina-
tion.""' The court rejected this interpretation of Hicks, saying that "the
Supreme Court envisioned that some cases exist where a prima facie case and
the disbelief of a pretext could provide a strong enough inference of actual
discrimination to permit the fact-finder to find for the plaintiff."' The
court did not "think that the Supreme Court meant to say that such a finding
would always be permissible. " "'
On the other hand, plaintiffs in other circuits have successfully argued that
once they have "pointed to some evidence discrediting the defendant's
proffered reasons, to survive summary judgment the plaintiff need not also
come forward with additional evidence of discrimination beyond his or her
prima facie case."' These courts hold that the plaintiff avoids summary
170. Woods, 30 F.3d at 260 n.3.
171. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
172. Woods, 30 F.3d at 260 n.3.
173. Id. (emphasis added). In support of its conclusion, the court offered the following
hypothetical:
[S]uppose an employee made out a truly barebones prima facie case of age
discrimination, and the employer responded that the employee lacked the necessary
skills for thejob. Suppose also that unrefuted evidence showed that the response was
a pretext, because the employer had fired the employee to conceal the employer's
own acts of embezzlement. In such an instance, there would be a prima facie case
at the outset and a disbelieved pretext, but we think it plain that no reasonable jury
could find age discrimination on such a record.
Id.
174. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming summary judgment for the employer because the
employee failed to cast substantial doubt on the employer's proffered reasons or provide evidence
from which a fact finder could reasonably conclude that the employer discriminated on the basis
of national origin); cf. Waldron v. SL Industries, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 996, 1004 n.l1 (D.N.J.
1994) (citing cases that conclude most of the decisions in the Third Circuit support a pretext-plus
analysis).
The Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits are consistent with the Third Circuit.
See Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming summary judgment
for the employer because evidence of instances where white employees were allegedly disciplined
less severely were not sufficiently similar to the circumstances leading to the plaintiff's dismissal);
Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 525 (11th Cir. 1994) (reversing a grant of summary
judgment in a § 1981 race discrimination suit); Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29
F.3d 1078 (6th Cir. 1994) (affirming denial of a directed verdict for the employer in an age
discrimination case); Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 1109 (8th Cir.)
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judgment because he has raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
employer's proffered reasons. 5
After Hicks it should be clear that a plaintiff must do more than
demonstrate mere pretext. After the employer has proffered its legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for discharging an employee, the trial judge must
consider the quantum of evidence to determine whether a fact finder could
reasonably find "both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was
the real reason.'176 Therefore, the plaintiff must offer additional evidence,
direct or circumstantial, that the employer discriminated. 1"
VIII. APPLICATION OF HICKS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Although the Court made it clear that it is "not enough ... to disbelieve
the employer,"' the circuits are split as to the quantum of evidence
required for the plaintiff to prove its case. Even though a circuit court may
require only a showing of mere pretext at the summary judgment level, that
level of production is not sufficient for the plaintiff to meet its ultimate burden
of proving intentional discrimination.
Several circuits appear to adopt the pretext-plus rule based on Hicks. For
example, after noting that the plaintiff had demonstrated the employer's
proffered reason was false and offered other evidence of her retaliatory
discharge, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "had the district
court stopped its analysis short of this point and reached its conclusion that
[the plaintiff] was subjected to retaliatory discharge based simply on her
(affirming a judgment for the plaintiff in an age discrimination suit), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 355
(1994); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming
the district court's holding that the plaintiff failed to show pretext in an age discrimination case).
The Ninth Circuit's position is unclear. Compare Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421,
1433 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that once a plaintiff proves a prima facie case and raises a genuine
issue as to the verity of the employer's proffered reason, such an issue cannot be resolved on
summary judgment) with Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating
that when evidence of pretext is lacking, summary judgment is appropriate even though plaintiff
may have established a minimal prima facie case).
175. However, "a party may not create a genuine issue of fact in response to a summary
judgment motion by filing an affidavit that contradicts earlier deposition testimony." King v.
Virginia Employment Comm'n, No. 93-1619, 1994 WL 416439 (4th Cir. Aug. 10, 1994) (per
curiam) (unpublished opinion) (citations omitted); Rohrboughv. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 916 F.2d 970,
976 (4th Cir. 1990); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)
(recognizing that "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment").
176. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993).
177. In Hicks the majority held that a plaintiff can prove its case by showing that the
employer's proffered reason was unworthy of credence. However, this rule applies only where
the plaintiff already has introduced other evidence suggesting that the employer discriminated.
178. Id. at 2754.
1995]
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demonstration that the defendants' excuse was false, we would have been
forced to vacate the judgment and remand in light of Hicks."179 Several
other courts have adopted this approach.'.The Sixth Circuit recently concluded that Hicks rejected both the pretext-
only and pretext-plus rules.' To raise an issue of fact regarding the
credibility of the employer's explanation, "the plaintiff is 'required to show by
a preponderance of the evidence either (1) that the proffered reasons had no
basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate his
discharge, or (3) that they were insufficient to motivate discharge.'"' The
first requires "evidence that the proffered bases for the plaintiff's discharge
never happened."' The third generally requires evidence that similarly
situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favor-
ably."M For the second, "the plaintiff argues that the sheer weight of the
circumstantial evidence of discrimination makes it 'more likely than not' that
179. Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1189 (1994).
180. See Lofton v. Marsh, 1994 WL 318787 (4th Cir. July 1, 1994) (unpublished opinion)
(holding that the district court correctly observed that in a Title VII case the plaintiff must do
more than disprove the defendant's articulated reasons, he must establish that the articulated
reasons were a pretext for prohibited discrimination); Sabry v. Gilbert See. Serv., Inc., 1994 WL
328278 n.6 (4th Cir. July 11, 1994) (unpublished opinion) (stating that even if the defendant's
articulated reasons were shown to be pretextual, judgment for the defendant would be proper
because the plaintiff did not carry the ultimate burden of proving that he was terminated on the
basis of race or national origin); Maness v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 7 F.3d 704, 707-08 (8th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2678 (1994) (stating that after the employer rebuts the prima facie
case, "discussion... relating to the prima facie case, non-discriminatory reasons and pretext are
immaterial at this stage, we consider these arguments only insofar as they may illuminate the
general question of whether retaliationor discrimination has been established." (citation omitted));
Moham v. Steego Corp., 3 F.3d 873, 875 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1307 (1994)
(concluding that rejection of the employer's reason is not a finding of intentional discrimination);
Pilditch v. Board of Educ., 3 F.3d 1113, 1117-18 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1065
(1994) (holding that beyond proving "the reasons proffered by the employer as fake . . . [the
employee] must also prove that the true reason for his firing was discriminatory." (citing Hicks,
113 S. Ct. at 2742)); Card v. Hercules Inc., No. 92-4169, 1993 WL 351337, at *5-6 (10th Cir.
Aug. 19, 1993); EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1319-20 (10th Cir. 1992); Lapieere v.
Benson Nissan, Inc., No. 92-3855, 1994 WL 149077, at *6-7 (mem.) (E.D. La. April 18, 1994);
Nelms v. Ross Stores, Inc., 1994 WL 241755 (M.D.N.C. 1994); Bailey v. South Carolina Dep't
of Social Services, 851 F. Supp. 219 (D.S.C. 1993); EEOC v. Louisiana Dep't of Social Servs.,
No. 91-4369, 1993 WL 408354, at *5-6 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 1993); EEOC v. MCI Int'l, Inc., 829
F. Supp. 1438, 1450-51 (D.N.J. 1993); Elmore v. Capstank, Inc., No. 9204004, 1993 WL
290259, at *11-12 (mem.) (D. Kan. July 8, 1993); Wright v. Office of Mental Health, No. 92-
0674, 1993 WL 267279, at *19 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1993).
181. See Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th Cir. 1994).
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the employer's explanation is a pretext, or coverup."18 To make this type
of showing, the court held, "the plaintiff may not rely simply upon his prima
facie evidence but must, instead, introduce additional evidence of age
discrimination. " "6 Each of these alternatives requires additional evidence
that creates an inference of intentional discrimination. Therefore, although the
court claims to be following Hicks rather than its prior pretext-plus approach,
this still is essentially a pretext-plus analysis. 18
IX. CONCLUSION
The majority in Hicks adopted a pretext-plus analysis. Although the
Court did not use this name, the language of the opinion supports this
conclusion. "Intuitively, it makes sense that the plaintiff should have to prove
that the defendant committed the action(s) upon which the complaint is
based."1 88  Although the Court attempted to resolve the dispute as to the
final stage of the McDonnell Douglas model, liberal commentators and judges
persist in twisting the words of the opinion to advocate a lighter standard of
proof for plaintiffs. The Hicks version of pretext-plus analysis provides the
best means of protecting Title VII victims while preventing the use of Title VII
as a "shield"189 against every adverse employment decision.
185. Id.
186. 29 F.3d at 1084.
187. But see id. at 1082-83; Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., No. 92-5919, 1993 WL 288280,
at *5 (6th Cir. July 29, 1993) (per curiam).
188. Howard E. Berkenblit, Survey, The Burden of Proof in Title VII Disparate Treatment
Actions: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 35 B.C. L. REV. 472, 483 (1994) (citing St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct).
189. Supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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